Many years ago, before the current war, before October 7, before the upheavals in my life, and even before Covid (do you remember those beautiful times?), I attended a very interesting meeting with an Israeli journalist, reporter, and commentator, organized as part of the Jewish Culture Festival in Krakow.
The meeting concerned, among other things, the geopolitical situation, Israeli politics, and its possible consequences. The host of the meeting spoke, among other things, about the differences in attitudes toward military service in the West Bank among fresh olim (immigrants to Israel) from different countries. Depending on the thought patterns and experiences acquired before immigration, the same duties, orders, and situations provoked extremely different reflections and reactions.
One of the questions that came from the audience was whether, in the long run, Israel is capable of reconciling its deeply humanistic approach to all minorities, its commitment to individual rights, openness, and the enormous, enormous energy of life with the necessity of ensuring the population's security, suppressing terrorism, and counteracting it. And how military service under these conditions affects the attitudes and behaviors of the very young soldiers who are still mostly so (olim are somewhat of an exception here).
The speaker reflected on this difficult question and admitted that the matter is difficult, raises concerns, and is fervently discussed in certain circles. Indeed, for a state built on leftist ideals, still optimistically looking at relations with its neighbors, these issues were difficult to balance. Nevertheless, as he concluded in a lighter tone, there is hope, because 'recently we discovered that we are a Jewish Sunni state in the Middle East.'
That was 8 years ago. The world has changed incredibly (and not for the better, in my humble opinion). Nevertheless, looking today at the tragic war with Iran I think about these words.
Iran has tried not only to destroy Israel since the beginning of the Ayatollahs' republic (I once wrote about the excellent relations between the two countries before the revolution). Israel was Iran's main target, but closely behind it was the desire for hegemony in the Middle East. Iran is a huge, populous, and ambitious country (sometimes in a criminal or tragic way, yet ambitious) and the Ayatollahs definitely wanted to be the main force in the region. Nevertheless, all the differences with most Arab countries played against them. Religious divisions (Shiite Iran versus Sunni majority of the Gulf states), linguistic (Persian versus Arabic), ethnic (Persians versus Arabs), and the not necessarily welcome political ambitions of Iran were a great obstacle. In the Ayatollahs' plan, a common enemy (Israel) and a shared grievance (emphasized grievance of the Palestinians) were supposed to unite. Undoubtedly, during the period of the revolution's victory in Iran, this worked, at least roughly speaking. Nevertheless, the revolution in Iran was preserved like an old photograph, and while Khomeini was a revolutionary, Khamenei was in many ways was the custodian of the revolution.
Khomeini and Arafat had a lot in common (support from the KGB and Moscow, political role in a bipolar world, partially similar goals). Khamenei had much less in common with various leaders, both of states and terrorist groups, in the Middle East.
Israeli diplomacy has for years tried to get closer to its Arab neighbors. Not without success. With the end of Nasser's era and the dominance of pan-Arabism, the chances increased. Peace with Egypt in the 1970s and with Jordan in the 1990s greatly improved the situation. In 2023, the signing of the Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia was close.
This was perceived as a great threat by Iran – its militias did everything they could to torpedo such a move, as well as by Hamas. Iran, after creating and arming Hezbollah, vassalizing Lebanon, largely colonizing Iraq, and winning a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, could not afford normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. It could not, and neither could Hamas, hence the attack on October 7 (in the following week, the Abraham Accords were supposed to be finalized).
Surely both Hamas and Iran thought that 2023 would be a blow to Israel that would bring them closer to 'pushing the Jews into the sea.' The blow was cruel. The largest, bloodiest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, the world's lack of compassion, accusations of genocide even before the war in Gaza began. The first major clash with Iran in 2025. It seemed that hopes for an alliance had at least greatly faded.
Today, when Iran is sending missiles not only at civilian targets in Israel (including apparently Jerusalem, so important to Muslims), but also at the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, it may turn out that Iran's desire to destroy Israel was the best catalyst for Israel's understanding with its neighbors.
A Jewish Sunni state?
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